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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRINITY AND SOTERIOLOGY
IN ORIGEN’S COMMENTARY ON THE GOSPEL OF JOHN AND
ON FIRST PRINCIPLES

Only a courageous man should write theology. The Christian in the pew can entertain
within his own mind heresies in every portion of his faith, but the man who writes his thoughts
down opens himself to criticism, not only by his contemporaries, but by generations of
succeeding believers. This criticism is almost certain to become increasingly unfair as time
passes. The meanings of words will change, new standards of orthodoxy will be established, and
the words and works of students and opponents alike will distort the position of the theologian in
the eyes of his later critics, to whom he will be unable to respond.
It should not come as a surprise, then, that Origen of Alexandria was perhaps the most
prolific author of the early church, for he was a man of unquestioned zeal and courage.1 Because
he was courageous, he was willing not only to write what Christians believe, but also to speculate
about how these things they believe may be. This mixture of orthodox exposition and seemingly
heretical speculation has mystified those who follow Origen.2 As Fairweather puts it:
Love and Hatred encircle the name of Origen This was the case already in his lifetime.
Some distrusted him as a heretic, others invoked his aid to silence heretics; by some he was
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Geoffrey W. Bromiley, Historical Theology: An Introduction (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark,
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almost worshipped [sic], by others he was bitterly disliked. And sometimes he suffered as
much at the hands of his injudicious partisans as from the opposition of his deadliest
enemies; for if the latter unscrupulously misrepresented his views, the former frequently
refined upon them.3
Even Rufinus, who translated many of Origen’s extant works into Latin with apologetic glosses,
was puzzled by Origen’s ability to be both orthodox and unorthodox.4
Usually, this vacillation between orthodoxy and heterodoxy occurs when he moves
from one doctrine to another. When dealing with the Scriptures, Origen argues that they are
divinely inspired, and therefore inerrant; humanly authored, and therefore personal; and that their
meaning, even when it is allegorical, is based on authorial intent.5 All in all, this is an
impressively orthodox position. When dealing with anthropology, however, Origen holds that
men are pre-existent souls which became embodied on earth when they fell from their original
state.6 Few Christians today would agree with anything Origen says about the origin of man. Like
his ancient successors, one can therefore find in Origen some doctrines with which one heartily
agrees, and others which are patently unacceptable.7
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G. W. Butterworth, introduction to Origen, On First Principles, trans. G. W. Butterworth
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Fairweather, Origen and Patristic, 68–70; Ronald E. Heine, introduction to Origen,
Commentary on the Gospel of John: Books 1–10, The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation,
vol. 80, trans. Ronald E. Heine (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1989), 13.
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When one comes to Origen’s doctrine of the Trinity, however, true doctrine and heresy
seem to exist side by side. Origen moves away from the materialistic conceptions of God
common to Tertullian and Justin Martyr and states that God is truly incorporeal. This allows for a
generation of the Son which neither divides the Godhead nor diminishes the Father, and lays the
foundation for Cappadocian thought.8 Yet serious subordinationism is also evident in Origen’s
scheme.9
One must wonder why. Origen’s works overflow with love for the Son as Savior, so it
is unreasonable to believe he demeans his deity for no reason.10 It is obvious that Origen did not
intend to be a heretic, for he considered himself a man of the church, and in fact wrote to convert
heretics.11 Admittedly, at the time of his writing clear criteria like those of Nicea had not yet been
established. But he maintained a subordinationist doctrine of the Trinity despite holding to a
philosophical scheme which allowed his immediate successor, Gregory Thaumaturgus, to
understand the members of the Trinity as ontologically equal.12
This paper will argue that Origen’s doctrine of the Trinity, as presented in On First
Principles and his Commentary on the Gospel of John, is subordinationist primarily for
soteriological reasons. More precisely, it will propose that Origen constructed a trinitarian
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Bernard Lonergan, The Way to Nicea, trans. Conn O’Donovan (Philadelphia:
Westminster, 1976), 60; Herbert Musurillo, “The Recent Revival of Origen Studies,”
Theological Studies 24 (Je 1963): 261; Crouzel, Origen, 182.
Aloys Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, trans. John Bowden, 2d ed.,vol. 1
(Atlanta: John Knox, 1975), 166; Musurillo, “Revival,” 261.
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de Lubac, “Origen,” 345–46; Crouzel, Origen, 197.
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doctrine which allowed him to protect the nature of the Father while allowing the salvation of
men. First, Origen’s doctrine of the Trinity in these works will be examined. Then, several
proposed methods for understanding the errors in his thought will be considered. Finally,
Origen’s doctrine of salvation will be examined, and the manner in which it depends upon the
Origenistic Trinity will be highlighted.

Origen’s Doctrine of the Trinity
It is interesting to note that, despite centuries of study, there is still disagreement about
the exact nature of Origen’s trinitarian thought. The reasonable place to begin in examining
anyone’s doctrine is his own writing, yet at this point difficulties arise. The vast majority of his
original works were destroyed under Justinian.13 Because only a few Greek fragments remain, the
modern reader must rely primarily on the Latin translations of Rufinus and Jerome, both of which
are suspect.14 There are places where Rufinus’s text, when compared with Greek fragments,
reveals that Rufinus has clearly made changes to make Origen more orthodox.15 Other textual
variants indicate that some sections of Origen’s Greek text were left out of the Latin translation,
and these are often distinctly heretical.16 Rufinus assumed that the text had been tampered with
by heretics, and as such felt free to make emendations necessary to restore what he believed had
to have been Origen’s original thought.17 In light of these difficulties, no attempt will be made to
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Crouzel, Origen, 41; de Lubac, “Origen,” 341.
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analyze Origen’s language in a technical sense. Instead, the general flow of his thought, his
consistent emphases, and his major themes will be observed. In this examination, On First
Principles will serve as the primary text, with additional material being drawn from the
Commentary on the Gospel of John as appropriate.

Origen’s Own Thought
Origen presents his doctrine of the Trinity throughout his writings. Here, five aspects
of that thought will be examined. Origen’s thoughts on the basic nature of the Father, the Son,
and the Holy Spirit will be observed. Then, the manner in which they are united will be
presented. Finally, the distinctions between them, distinctions which imply ontological
subordination, will be examined.

The Father
Origen rehearses his understanding of the apostolic teaching about the Father in the
preface to On First Principles:
First, that God is one, who created and set in order all things, and who, when nothing
existed, caused the universe to be. He is God from the first creation and foundation of the
world, the God of all righteous men, of Adam, Abel...Moses and the prophets. This God, in
these last days, according to the previous announcements made through his prophets, sent
the Lord Jesus Christ, first for the purpose of calling Israel, and secondly, after the unbelief
of the people of Israel, of calling the Gentiles also. This just and good God, the Father of our
Lord Jesus Christ, himself gave the law, the prophets and the gospels, and he is God both of
the apostles and also of the Old and New Testments.18
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DP, preface.4, 2; That this refers to the Father is obvious in light of the following
paragraphs, which discuss Christ and the Holy Spirit.
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This presentation clearly intends to refute the heresies of the time. To refute Gnosticism, it rejects
any concept of pre-existent matter.19 It also refutes the Marcionite position that distinguishes the
just, creator God of the Old Testament from the good, redeeming God of the New Testament.20
This description of God is also notably silent about God’s nature. Other than stating
that he is good and just, God the Father is described primarily in terms of his relation to the
world. This reticence is characteristic of Origen; the Father remains somewhat obscure.21 Two
factors contribute to Origen’s unwillingness to comment about the Father’s nature. First, he
conceives of God as inherently unknowable, at least to men. No one is able to speak worthily
about the Father.22 A second, and perhaps more important, reason for his relative silence is his
assumption that he and his reader will share certain ground about what it means to be God. For
example, Origen argues that there has always been a creation based on the notion that for God to
be good, provident, and omnipotent, he would always have needed a creation over which to
exercise these attributes.23 He does this without any obvious warrant, which indicates that he
assumes his reader will agree that this is just how God is. Other than the heretics mentioned
above, the church held a consensus about the nature of God. Origen confidently proclaims that
“all who in any way believe in the existence of Providence admit that God, who created and set
19

Citations from Origen’s Commentary on the Gospel of John will henceforth be noted by
CGJ, and will be cited by book, paragraph, and the page number on which they appear in
Commentary on the Gospel of John: Books 1–10, The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation,
vol. 80, trans. Ronald E. Heine (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1989); cf.
CGJ, 1.103, 55.
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CGJ, 1.253, 85.
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Fairweather, Origen and Patristic, 150.
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in order the entire creation, is unbegotten.”24 The nature of the Son was the present point of
controversy.
Origen’s general silence about the nature of the Father may suggest that he considers
what he does say about him to be crucial, or at least controversial. The best way to understand the
Father is as totally incorporeal. Arguing from John 4, “God is spirit,” Origen properly notes that
Jesus says this to oppose attempts to locate God for worship. The fact that God is a “consuming
fire” in Deut 4:24 does not require that he have a body, for he consumes evil thoughts and
intentions of the mind, not physical objects. God is, in fact, “simple intellectual existence.”25God
has no material characteristics whatsoever, and therefore is completely invisible. This pure
incorporeality is a key aspect of divinity; only God is completely bodiless.26

The Son
While Origen assumes most aspects of the nature of the Father, he argues for an
understanding of the Son based upon the titles given him in the Bible. While many of his
contemporaries focus on the Son as Word, Origen warns against exclusively thinking of the Son
as Word. It is true that the Son is God’s Word, his rational organizing principle, but that is not all
he is.27 While Origen treats many of the titles of the Son, central to Origen’s understanding of the
Son’s nature are the titles wisdom, only-begotten, and image.28
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Ibid., 1.1.2–6, 8–10.
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The Scriptures call the Son wisdom because he is “God’s wisdom hypostatically
existing.” As such he is incorporeal, for wisdom possesses no physicality. He is also eternal, for
God has never existed without his wisdom. God eternally and continually begets his wisdom, the
Son.29 This is one of Origen’s crucial contributions to the development of a doctrine of the
Trinity, for he is one of the first to draw upon Prov 8:22 and use the equation of the Son with
wisdom to argue for his eternality.30
It is in this sense, as the existence of the Father’s wisdom, that he is the only-begotten.
He is not begotten in a way similar to human or animal begetting. In the Godhead, begetting
implies neither physical division nor temporal occurrence, for “God was always the Father of his
only-begotten Son.”31 This is not a necessary occurrence, for the Son is begotten by the will of
the Father. Nor is the begetting of the Son like the Gnostic notion of emanation, for the Father’s
nature is not divided by the begetting of the Son.32
Because he is begotten by his Father, the Son is related to the Father as Seth was to
Adam, and therefore bears his image. The Son is a reflection of all the Father is. He is
incorporeal and invisible. The Father and Son share a unity of nature and substance, and the Son
does all that the Father does. As the Father is essentially good, so also the Son is essentially

29

Ibid., 1.2.2, 15.
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Barbara Newman, “Sergius Bulgakov and the Theology of Divine Wisdom,” Saint
Vladimir's Theological Quarterly 22, no. 1 (1978): 95; Maurice F. Wiles, “Eternal Generation,”
Journal of Theological Studies 12 (Oct 1961): 286.
31

DP, 1.2.4, 17; 4.4.1, 313–14.
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Ibid., 1.2.6, 19.
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good, and not accidentally so, like created beings. The Son’s goodness is not a different goodness
than the Father’s, for he draws his goodness from the father.33 Likewise their power is one, for:
As regards the power of his works, then, the Son is in no way whatever separate or different
from the Father, nor is his work anything other than the Father’s work, but there is one and
the same movement, so to speak, in all they do...there is absolutely no dissimilarity between
the Son and the Father. Some indeed have said that the Son’s acts are to be compared with a
pupil’s work in likeness to or imitation of his master...yet how can these opinions be
reconciled with the Gospel.34
Therefore the Son can also be called the Almighty. The Son is in every way the image of the
Father, for he participates in the Father and draws his divinity from the Father. Origen chastens
those who deny that the Savior knows all that is true to serve a “delusion of glorifying the
Father.”35

The Holy Spirit
While Origen’s systematic treatment of the Holy Spirit is rather brief, it is clear that he
likewise draws who he is from the Father and the Son.36 Like them he is a strictly incorporeal
intellectual existence, and therefore deity. He has a personal existence, and is not just a force or
energy. That he merits high honor is obvious, for his name is included in the formula of saving
baptism. Against those who propose that the Word educates the Holy Spirit, Origen guards his
immutability, which is an attribute only God possesses. While the Holy Spirit is not greater than

33

Ibid., 1.2.6, 19; 1.2.10, 26; 1.2.13, 27; CGJ, 1.62, 46.
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DP, 1.2.12, 26.
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CGJ, 2.17, 99; 1.187, 71.
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the Son as Word, Origen allows the Holy Spirit to occupy a position higher than that of the
incarnate Son, for against the Holy Spirit no blasphemy will be forgiven.37

Unity
Given the clear distinctions Origen draws between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, one
might wonder how they are one God. In addressing this, Origen notes several ways in which the
three are united. As has already been noted, the Son shares in the Father’s nature, substance,
goodness, and power. The Holy Spirit likewise shares in the nature of the Father and the Son.
“There is nothing that was not made except the nature of the Father, the Son and the Holy
Spirit.”38 Only the Trinity possesses incorporeality, and only these three are essentially and
unchangeably good. While each member has his own role within God’s dealings with men,
“there is no separation in the Trinity.”39
While embracing the unity of the Godhead, Origen is careful to reject a modalistic
concept of the Trinity. When discussing both the Son and the Holy Spirit, he points out that each
is a personal individual, and not just an empowerment or force.40 He also responds specifically to
those who believe in the Father and the Word, but consider the Holy Spirit to be an activity of the
Father. “We, however, are persuaded that there are three hypostases, the Father, the Son, and the
Holy Spirit.”41

37

DP, 1.1.3, 8; 1.3.2, 29–30; 1.3.4, 33; CGJ, 2.81–82, 115.

38

DP, 4.4.8, 323.

39

Ibid., 2.1.2, 81; 1.5.3, 47; 1.3.7, 38.
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Ibid., 1.2.2, 15; 1.3.1, 29.
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Origen seems to steer the straight course between modalism and tritheism. His
commentary on John 1:1 cautions the reader not to deny a distinct “individual nature” in the Son,
but also not to “make his individual nature and essence as an individual to be different from the
Father.”42 In terms of his language and general thought, Origen seems to be an early proponent of
Nicene Trinitarianism. He states that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three persons
who share one nature. What could be wrong with that?

Subordinationism
The problem with Origen’s Trinitarianism is that, while the three share the one divine
nature, Origen sees them sharing a nature that is inherently the nature only of the Father. The Son
and Holy Spirit share in this nature only by his permission. This ontological inequality is evident
in Origen’s treatment of both the Son and the Holy Spirit.
From Origen’s discussion of the Son’s generation, it is clear the Son is not inherently
God the way the Father is. The Son is begotten eternally, not by the necessity of the divine
nature, but by the will of the Father. He is truth because, “according to the will of the Father, he
has embraced the whole principle of the universe.”43 In fact, the Son is only God contingently. He
is God because he is with God, “and he would not remain God if he did not continue in
unceasing contemplation of the depth of the Father.”44 The Son does not exist necessarily, is not
true necessarily, and is not God necessarily.

42

Ibid., 2.16, 98.
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DP, 1.2.6, 18; CGJ, 1.186, 71.
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As the Father controls the Son’s possession of the divine nature, so he himself
possesses it more perfectly than the Son. The Savior is not purely and simply good in himself,
but draws goodness from the Father. Origen states that the “Saviour...is the image of God’s
goodness, and not goodness itself.”45 The Father, in fact, is greater than the Son in every way, for
“the saying, ‘My father who sent me is greater than I,’ is true in all respects.”46 This inequality,
despite the fact that the Son shares in the Father’s nature, is due to the fact that one who
participates in the nature of another, like the Son does in the Father, cannot do so to the point of
complete absorption. The Son cannot equal the Father in whose nature he shares.47
If Origen does a disservice to the Son, his treatment of the Holy Spirit is far worse. For
Origen, while the Holy Spirit is a member of the Trinity, he is “the most honored of all things
made through the Word.”48 He is the first in rank among made things, but a made thing
nevertheless. The Holy Spirit also needs the Son to exist, and his existence is dependent upon the
continued ministry of the Son.49 While Origen reserves the title, “the God,” for the Father, and
allows the Son and other heavenly beings to be “Gods,” Fairweather observes that he nowhere
calls the Holy Spirit, “God.”50
Origen is unwilling to allow the Holy Spirit the power of God either. The Father is the
authority over everything that exists, and the Son permeates the universe he created and rules
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CGJ, 2.13–17, 98–99; Fairweather, Origen and Patristic, 156.
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over all the rational creatures. The Spirit, beneath the Son, acts only in the lives of the saints. His
authority is only over those “who abide in God.”51 Despite this limited purview, the Holy Spirit is
unable to accomplish his task unaided. When the time came to redeem man, the Son had to be
the one to do so.52
There is, then, a clear ranking in Origen’s Trinity. It is not just a ranking of authority,
but of nature. While the Son and the Holy Spirit share the Father’s nature, they do so
contingently, and imperfectly. Justin Martyr and Tertullian had struggled to get past the temporal
priority of the Father implied by the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit.
Origen removed this stumbling block by positing an eternal generation, but then replaced
temporal priority with a causal and ontological priority which resulted in a subordinationism
more radical than that held by his orthodox predecessors.

Possible Explanations
It is surprising that Origen avoided the conclusion of his successors, the conclusion that
the three members of the Godhead who share a single incorporeal nature must be equal. There
are several possible explanations for Origen’s subordinationism. Perhaps Origen was not
subordinationist at all, as Crouzel contends. It may be that his dependence upon Platonism forced
a subordinationist conclusion. Or, given the fact that he developed his theology from the
Scriptures, it is possible that his errant theology may have gone astray due to his errant exegesis.
These possibilities will now be considered.

51

Ibid., 6.107, 198; DP, 1.3.5, 33–34.
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No Subordinationism
Crouzel has written what amounts to a modern defense of Origen. He argues that, of
the ancient charges against Origen, only the one leveled against Origen’s doctrine of pre-existent
souls had merit. However, this doctrine was not dogma, but was speculation in an area in which
the church had yet to formulate dogma, so Origen remained orthodox. Crouzel states:
If care is taken to study exactly the trinitarian doctrine of Origen, it will first be seen that
the unity of the Father and the Son is expressed fairly exactly by formulae that are of an
order more dynamic than ontological and that in spite of a few clumsy expressions his
subordinationism is not heterodox...he affirms, as Athanasius and Hilary themselves were to
do, both the equality of power of the Persons and a certain subordination of the Son to the
Father.53
Origen has an acceptable view of the Trinity because he maintains an essential unity among the
members, he states they are equal in power, and he presents a subordination at the level of
authority.
A defense of this sort can fail at either of two levels. First, it seems that the standards
advanced for orthodoxy are inadequate. Specifically, is equality of power the only equality which
orthodoxy demands? It has been noted, for example, that while Origen states the goodness of the
Son is the goodness of the Father, the Son does not possess it as the Father does. If equality of
power is all that is important, one could argue that the Son is evil and still be orthodox.
Orthodoxy demands that the members of the Trinity be equal in every respect, and not just
power.54
However, Crouzel correctly notes that this definition of orthodoxy is anachronistic for
Origen. The rule of faith had not elucidated a doctrine of the Trinity with this sort of specificity
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Origen, 268.
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Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology, 2d ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000), 361–62.
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when Origen wrote, and had not even identified whether the Holy Spirit was created or made.55 It
is fairer to judge Crouzel’s defense at another level. Does he accurately characterize Origen’s
thought and writing?
The greater problem with Crouzel’s argument is that he himself reads Origen
anachronistically, reading into Origen’s statements about the members of the Trinity sharing one
nature a clear indication of a belief in essential unity. If Origen posits such a unity, statements
which suggest ontological subordination of the Son and Spirit are only apparent heterodoxy, and
can be reconciled with orthodoxy. Because Origen argues that the essence of the Son is not
different from that of the Father,56 Crouzel assumes his understanding of essence is that of the
later ecumenical creeds.
But Origen has a less precise understanding of essence. When discussing the nature of
rational creatures, he states:
Everyone who shares in anything is undoubtedly of one substance and one nature with him
who shares in the same thing. For example, all eyes share in the light, and therefore all eyes,
which share in the light, are of one nature. But though every eye shares in the light, yet since
one eye sees clearly and another dimly, every eye does not share equally in the light.57
This passage shows that Origen’s doctrine of shared substance requires neither genuine unity nor
equality. The eyes of all men, obviously distinct and separate, are nevertheless of “one substance
and one nature.” Also, the fact that they share a nature does not guarantee that they are equal in
the nature they share. Others have noted this imprecision in the way Origen uses ousia. As it can
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for Aristotle, for Origen ousia can mean either a particular species or a more general genus.58
While none of these arguments proves that Origen does not believe in the essential unity of the
Trinity, taken together they remove the credibility of a position which seeks to justify the
subordinationist statements noted above in light of an obvious belief in an essential unity in the
Godhead. While Crouzel may be correct in trying to soften the criticism against Origen, he is
wrong to reject it altogether.

Platonic Influence
Admitting, then, that Origen does hold to an unorthodox subordinationism, one might
wonder if he was forced into it by his reliance upon a philosophical system. He was, after all, a
brilliant intellectual, living in a Christian community of philosophers, for whom the intellectual
side of Christianity was important.59 Platonism is evident throughout Origen’s teaching, so some
suggest that he simply applies a Christian veneer to Platonism.60 Others admit that his thought is
genuinely Christian, but maintain that he uses “Platonic ideas to reinterpret the whole range of
Christian teaching on God, Christ, and salvation.”61 Lonergan states that Origen is deceived by
the Platonic concept of ideals, which forces him to say the Son has divinity only by
participation.62 Origen’s use of false philosophy results in his heterodox conclusions.
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Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers: Faith, Trinity, and
Incarnation, 3d ed., vol. 1 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 321, 329.
59
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Attributing Origen’s subordinationism primarily to his philosophy mistakes the role
philosophy plays in Origen’s scheme. He is not a blind follower of philosophy, but a learned,
critical eclectic, who understands that philosophy is at best a hazardous tool for the Christian.63
He is convinced that philosophy is inadequate to ascertain absolute truth, and so is not so much a
philosopher as a theologian who uses philosophy.64
His use of philosophy belies his dependence upon it, for he is willing to state things
contrary to Greek philosophy. The concept of another world was common in Greek philosophy,
and usually took the form of a world of ideas. For Origen, however, this world is not just a world
of ideas, but of personal, spiritual beings, including God. While both Plato and the Stoics denied
any concept of individual providence, Origen heartily endorses it.65 Origen is aware that Platonic
thought made no allowance for the Holy Spirit, and while Origen’s treatment thereof is lacking,
he nevertheless argues for a distinctly Christian concept in espousing a Trinity. His God is
likewise more personal than the god of Greek philosophy, who was strictly impassible. Origen
denies that God is strictly impassible, allowing him the passion of love.66 Origen even disagrees
with Plato about the origin of the universe. Plato argued that it was crafted out of pre-existent
matter,67 but Origin affirmed creation ex nihilo. Therefore, while it would be foolish to deny that
philosophy had any impact on Origen’s thought, it would be equally foolish to suggest it
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determined his thought. Rather, Origen used philosophy to aid him in developing and expressing
his understanding of the biblical message.

Biblical Interpretation
If this is true, it may be that an error in his method for determining the biblical message
drove Origen to subordinationism. After all, the study of the Bible was central to Origen’s life;
the vast majority of Origen’s writings are exegetical, either homilies or commentaries.68 His
extension of Jesus’ contention, that the Father was greater than he, to all aspects of the
relationship of the Father to the Word implies Origen’s subordinationism may be based solely on
his interpretation of Scripture. However, while Origen’s theology may be based upon Scripture,69
his use thereof is far too flexible to force him to hold a position with which he otherwise
disagrees.
Origen’s use of allegorical interpretation is well known, and will not be discussed
here.70 What is instead pertinent is the fact that allegorical interpretation is not the only
interpretive method which Origen uses. At times his exegesis is hyperliteral. In discussing the
heavenly beings, he argues that the principalities, authorities, powers, and dominions are specific
titles ascribed by Paul, and that the list is not exhaustive because there are some who “will be
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named in the world to come.”71 Likewise he sees a conflict which must be reconciled between
John 1:17 and John 14:6. In one the truth comes through Jesus, in the other he is the truth, and
one cannot be the channel through which one’s self comes.72 When contrasted with the
allegorical interpretations for which Origen is better known, these and similar passages show that
Origen uses variable amounts of literal exegesis in his homilies, and is too imprecise in his use of
Scripture for it to force him into a position which he finds disturbing.73 In fact, one of the reasons
he resorts to allegorical interpretation is to explain passages that he believes would otherwise be
unworthy of God.74 Therefore, one cannot say Origen holds to a subordinationism simply because
he finds it in the Scripture. If he finds it in the Scripture, it is because he is willing to believe it.

The Influence of Origen’s Soteriology on his Doctrine of the Trinity
It has been demonstrated that Origen believes in a doctrine of the Trinity which posits a
genuine, unnecessary ontological subordination of the Son and Holy Spirit. It has also been
shown that this subordinationism is not forced upon Origen by an unfair reading of his works,
nor was it imposed on him by a foreign philosophical system, or by a single determinative
hermeneutic. This leaves a final proposed cause of Origen’s heterodox trinitarianism, his
soteriology. Before this is dismissed, it should be recognized that the doctrine of the Trinity was
not historically the basis from which early Christians developed a theology. Historically, the
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doctrine of the Trinity developed from Christology, and the propriety of a Christology was often
tested in respect to its soteriological implications.75 The Cappadocians, for example, were
unwilling to accept Apollinarius’s Christology in part because they did not see how the Son
could save the rational soul of man if he did not assume it. The point of departure for
Athanasius’s Christology in On the Incarnation of the Logos of God is the question, “Why did
the incarnation occur?” Because the Word became incarnate to restore man, doctrine must
recognize him as the God-man.76 Soteriology, then, has historically played a key role in the
development of both Christology and trinitarian theology.

Origen’s Soteriology
Like any good soteriology, Origen’s begins with the creation and fall of man. However,
the creation and fall which Origen has in mind are radically different from the modern
evangelical understandings thereof. In the beginning, God created a vast number of rational
minds. These included all the minds of spiritual beings, including what are now angels, demons,
and men. The Bible refers to angels as men, as in Genesis 19, so it is clear that all spiritual,
rational beings, are generically dubbed men.77 These men were created “according to the image
of God,” that is, according to the Son, who is the image. As such, all these minds shared in the
nature of the Son, and therefore have wisdom and rationality from him.78 These spiritual beings
were also created with free will, and were able to choose whether or not to remain in
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contemplation of God. Because they were created, and therefore passed from a time of nonexistence to a time of existence, they were mutable. The goodness they enjoyed in the presence of
God was not their own essentially, but only an accidental goodness granted by the Father.79
Over time, these created minds lost interest in their contemplation of the Father, and
began to drift slowly away from him.80 This movement away from perpetual devotion to the
Father was the fall, and in it man fell in several ways. Because God is good, moving away from
him can be nothing other than evil. Because God is life, they fell into death. Because God is
rational, moving away from him is movement into the irrational, and therefore sin. This
movement into wickedness on the part of these spiritual minds was a movement into non-being.81
Not all minds fell to the same extent, and the depths to which they fell determined the density of
the bodies they received. Those that fell less, received angelic forms. Those who fell to the
present state of man, however, were given solid physical bodies. Now, through both the habit of
contemplating evil and the passions inspired by bodies, these minds are trapped in sin.82
It is unreasonable to think, however, that these souls, a part of which constitute the
present race of man, could utterly thwart God’s plan for them. The soul of man was created by
God and is able to know him, and therefore shares in his incorporeality, so it cannot utterly
perish.83 So, while every soul will be punished for its sins, the end result of that punishment is
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positive subjugation to the Father.84 In this respect the proclamation of 1 Cor 15:28, that in the
end God will be “all in all,” encapsulates Origen’s thought. He quotes all or part of the verse
thirteen times in On First Principles, and four times in the extant of the first ten books of his
Commentary on the Gospel of John. For Origen, the only logical end that the universe can have is
a restoration to a unity of all rational beings in willing subjugation to the Father.85 This final
restoration, the apocatastasis, is not so much a certain dogma for Origen as a hopeful speculation
based upon the sovereignty of God and his total victory over evil.86 To achieve this victory, God
took action.
Because of his love for man, the Son became man to save all the spiritual beings.87
Man needed a savior to do two things to accomplish this. Man needed to be freed from the power
of sin and evil under which he had put himself. Christ did that by his death, by which he expiated
sin before the Father, triumphed over the forces of wickedness, and bought men back from the
sin to which they had sold themselves.88 Man also needed to be restored to the life which he had
before he fell. This restoration is only achieved when men participate in the Son through whom
they were created.
Participation in the Son, and indeed the Godhead as a whole, is the key element in
Origen’s soteriology. It is by participation in the Son that men are pardoned, that they receive
84
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life, and that they receive rationality.89 This participation is not an absolute affair, but a gradual
process by which men reascend to their proper place. But the goal of all is to ascend back to the
Father, and participate in the divine nature itself.90
But direct contact with the Father is impossible. On cannot partake of the Father or the
Son except by the Holy Spirit.91 Nor can one partake of the Father except through the Son. That
is why he is the door, because one must “ascend from below to the divinity of the Son through
which one can be led also to the blessedness of the Father.”92 Each member of the Trinity has a
role in salvation. The Holy Spirit purifies the saint, the Word provides knowledge for proper
living, and the Father perfects, so “that which exists shall be as worthy as he who caused it to
exist,” because it will be “unceasingly and inseparably present with him who really exists.”93 Yet,
in all this, the Son remains the channel through which men can be deified.94

Trinitarian Implications of Origen’s Soteriology
The salvation of men requires three functions impossible for God the Father himself.
First, it requires men to be genuinely united to God, and Origen posits a dramatic union. The
perfect believer in fact becomes Christ, like the apostle John did in front of the cross. There Jesus
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proclaimed to Mary the John was her son, i.e., Christ himself.95 The union is such that sins
against the disciples are reckoned as sins against Christ.96 Second, it requires for God to be
multiple things, an impossibility for an essentially simple God. The Son, however, is made many
things because men need so much to be saved. Finally, the salvation of man requires that the
savior be sullied with sin. While this is an impossibility for the Father, the Son is able to be
darkened by the sin for which he atones and then purified by the Father.97
It is this first requirement, the need to be genuinely united with the Son to participate in
the Father through him, which is at the root of Origen’s trinitarian problems. On the one hand,
men have to become Christ to receive the divine nature. On the other hand, men obviously do not
become Christ, for none of them can become God. Origen resolves this dilemma by making the
unity of participation between the Father and the Son the same as the unity of participation
between the Son and the saint. After all, no one participates in another to the point of equality,
neither the Son in the Father nor the saint in the Son.98 One place Origen clearly suggests that he
intends this parallel of relationships is in a Greek fragment omitted from Rufinus’s translation.
He says, “We, therefore, having been made according to the image, have the Son, the original, as
the truth of the noble qualities that are within us. And what we are to the Son, such is the Son to
the Father.”99 A similar passage discusses the role of Father as the source of divinity and the Son
as the source of reason, stating, “The reason which is in each rational being has the same position
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in relation to the Word which is in the beginning with God, which is God the Word, which God
the Word has with God.”100
This parallel could have developed in two ways. Origen may argue for a simultaneous
unity of essence and ontological inferiority within the Godhead so that he can legitimately argue
that men are saved by being united with the Son while remaining ontologically inferior to him.
Or, it could be, that in attempting to understand the unity of the Son with the Father, he drew
upon the form of unity he already believed to exist between the Son and the saints. That his view
of the Trinity was not the prior position which influenced his soteriology seems evident from the
high esteem in which he held the Savior; he would not have diminished the Son without a reason.

Conclusion
It has been argued that Origen holds to an ontological subordination primarily because
of his belief in the restoration of man to unity with God, at least as these doctrines are presented
in On First Principles and the Commentary on the Gospel of John. His subordinationism is
impossible to deny, and it cannot be satisfactorily explained by appealing to Origen’s
philosophical or biblical methods. The remarkable parallel between the way in which the Son is
God and the way in which men are saved is difficult to ignore. Whether this connection was
made consciously or subconsciously is unknown. What does seem clear is that Origen
constructed an intricate body of doctrine, in which the crucial element of soteriology could not
help influencing other doctrines, especially his doctrine of the Trinity.
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